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AMERICAN RIVERS, INC. v. FERC:
CONFLICT BETWEEN

FERC AUTHORITY UNDER THE

FEDERAL POWER ACT AND STATE AUTHORITY UNDER
SECTION 401 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT IN THE

HYDROELECTRIC LICENSING PROCESS
Cory L. Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or
Commission) has central decision-making authority under the Federal
Power Act (FPA)' to issue licenses to hydroelectric power facilities.2
However, that authority is fragmented by the influence of other
agencies, both federal and state, which have an impact on the
hydropower licensing process.' It has been estimated that at least forty
federal statutes impact the licensing procedure.4 One of those statutes
is the Clean Water Act (CWA), under, which an applicant for a federal
license is required to receive a certification by the state that its activities
will not violate the water laws of that state.' Any conditions imposed by

Cory L. Taylor is an attorney with Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., headquartered in
Kansas City, Missouri. She earned her J.D. from the University of Tulsa College of Law in 1998
and her B.A. from Indiana University in 1995.
116 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1920).
2
Hydroelectric power has been an important source of energy in the United States for
over a century. Judith A. Johansen, Is Hydropoweran EndangeredSpecies?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES
AND ENV'T, 13(1994). Its supporters generally consider it to be a viable alternative to other forms
of energy sources. "Relative to other sources of power, hydroelectric dam facilities are an
attractive option since they do not consume fossil fuels or produce undesirable by-products such
as air pollutants or radioactive waste." Nathaniel Stevens, Canada and the United States Dealing With the Hydra Power Paradox: Evaluatingthe Environmental Effects of a Natural
Energy Source, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv., 273,274 (1995). "Hydropower is also cheaper
than other forms of electricity, its prices are stable, and the plants are relatively simple and
inexpensive to operate. Moreover, hydropower is a more reliable source because it is both
domestically available and renewable and thus not subject to the vagaries of politics and markets."
Michael T. Pyle, Note, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring
America's Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 115-16 (1995). However, construction ofhydropower
facilities can also negatively affect a river ecosystem. See Johansen, supra,at 14; Stevens, supra,
at 275.
3
See Donald H. Clarke, Relicensing Hydropower: The Many Faces of Competition,
11 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T, 8 (1996).
4
George William Sherk, Approaching a GordianKnot: The Ongoing State/Federal
Conflict Over Hydropower, 31 LAND & WATER L. REv. 349, 361 (1996).
533 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977).
'Certification may also be waived by the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1977).
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the state in its certification must be included as conditions of the federal
license.'
The authority given to the states under the CWA has
consistently clashed with the FERC's hydroelectric licensing authority
under the FPA, 8 primarily due to the conflicting purposes of the
statutes. Judicial interpretations of the relationship between state
agencies and the FERC, and of the statutes that they enforce, have been
inconsistent at best.
In American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC,9 petitioners American
Rivers, Inc. (American Rivers) and the State of Vermont sought review

of six FERC orders that issued licenses to hydropower facilities but
refused to incorporate several conditions imposed by Vermont pursuant
to its certification authority under the CWA. The Commission
contended that if it determines that state-imposed conditions are beyond
the scope of the state's authority under the CWA, then it may exclude
those conditions from the license. This contention represented a
reversal in the FERC's position on this issue. The Commission had
previously held that it had no authority to review the appropriateness of
the state-imposed conditions. American Rivers and Vermont contended
that the Commission was required to incorporate all of the stateimposed conditions into the licenses and that the legality of the
conditions may only be challenged by the licensee in a court of
appropriatejurisdiction. The Second Circuit agreed with the petitioners
and held that the Commission did not have the authority to exclude
state-imposed conditions. The Court further held that the FERC's
inability to refuse the conditions did not conflict with the Commission's
authority under the FPA.'0
This Article scrutinizes the American Rivers opinion and
concludes that such a precedent could have a negative impact on the
ability of the FERC to carry out the purposes of the FPA. The FPA
presents a balanced approach to hydropower licensing, requiring the
FERC to consider development, energy conservation,and environmental
concerns when it issues a hydropower license. If the FERC has no
authority to review and reject state-imposed conditions, state agencies
will invariably take advantage of their authority and disrupt the
comprehensive approach of the FPA.
733 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (1977).
8

For a general discussion of the conflict between federal and state authority in the

hydropower licensing process, see Sherk, supra note 4.

9129 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 1997).
IId. at 102, 106.
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Part H of this Article provides a general overview of the CWA
and the FPA, the conflict that has arisen between the two statutes, and
ajudical interpretation of the statutes. Part I1 sets forth the factual and
procedural history of American Rivers. Part IV analyzes the Second
Circuit's reasoning and discusses the ramifications of the decision. Part
V concludes that the American Rivers decision further disrupts the
balance between federal and state authority to regulate hydropower
licensing and calls for legislative action to restore that balance.
H1. BACKGROUND

A. Origins of Federal and State Authority: The FPA and CWA
1. The Federal Power Act
The FPA was enacted in 1920 to establish "a broad federal role
in the development and licensing of hydroelectric power."" The FERC
receives its hydropower licensing authority from section 4(e) of the
FPA. This section instructs the Commission to issue licenses for
hydroelectric facilities which are "necessary or convenient ... for the
development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from,
or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress
has jurisdiction."' 2 Section 4(e) further instructs that, when deciding
whether to issue a license,
the Commission, in addition to the power and
development purposes for which licenses are issued,
shall give equal consideration to the purposes of
energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of
damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife ...,
the protection of opportunities, and the preservation of
other aspects of environmental quality. 3

11129 F.3d at 111 (quoting California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490,496 (1990)).
1216 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1920).
3

1 1d. This language was added by the Environmental Consumer Protection Act
(ECPA). Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a),
8036) (1920)).
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2. The Clean Water Act
The states receive their authority to impact the hydropower
licensing process under section 401 of the CWA. The objective of the
CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters."' 14 The Act gives broad authority to the
states to help achieve this objective. 5 Under section 401(a), an
applicant for a federal license must first receive state certification that
any discharge will not violate the state water quality standards.' 6
Section 401(d) authorizes the states to set forth effluent limitations and
monitoring requirements in the certification and further asserts that
these will become conditions of the federal license.' 7
3. Conflict Between the Statutes
A conflict arises between the FERC and state agencies in the
licensing process due to the differing purposes of the statutes they
enforce. The FPA requires the FERC to consider a combination of

1433
U.S.C. § 1251 (1977).
15The State is limited in this regard by section 1313(c)(2)(A), which states:
[W]ater quality standard[s] shall consist of the designated uses of the
navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters
based upon such uses. Such standards shall be such as to protect the
public health or welfare, enhance the quality of the water and serve the
purposes of this chapter. Such standards shall be established taking into
consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of
fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and
other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for
navigation.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994). The Environmental Protection Agency defines
criteria as "elements of State water quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations,
levels, or narrative statements, representing a quality of water that supports particular use. When
criteria are met, water quality will generally protect the designated use." 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b)
(1994).
633 U.S.C. § 134 l(a)() (1977). The section states, in relevant part:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity ...
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide
the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State ...that
any such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions ofsections
title.
1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this
Id.
33
ci
U.SC §.1251(d) (1977). he section states
In
releya~t part,
thgt"ny
ons ann oter
certifcation provided under thissection shal set orth any ettluent imitat
become a condition on any
and monitoring requirements necessary ... and shall
limitations,
Id.
or permit subject tothe provisions of thissection."
Federal license
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factors, including water-related environmental concerns, when it issues
a hydropower license.' 8 The CWA, however, gives states certification
authority for the sole purpose of protecting their own water resources,
and state agencies have no obligation to consider any other interests
when they issue a certification. This difference in purposes often
results in differing expectations of hydroelectric facilities and their
responsibilities according to the FERC and the state agencies, which in
turn may result in contradicting opinions about what types ofconditions
should be included in a federal license.
State agencies may now use their authority under the CWA to
further goals which are not related to water quality under the CWA. 19
For example, state agencies may consider factors such as fisheries,
aesthetics, or recreation when they issue a certification. ° Some
agencies have even required that applicants satisfy conditions which are
not related to the project.2 This has resulted in the FERC including
conditions in its licenses which are invalid under the provisions of the
CWA or FPA and inconsistent with the FERC's role under the FPA.
It has traditionally been the policy of the FERC to include all
state-imposed conditions in hydropower licenses, whether or not it
believed the conditions were valid under section 401 of the CWA.2
The FERC has consistently held that "review of the appropriateness of
the conditions is within the purview of the state courts and not the
Commission."23 However, that policy has consistently placed the FERC
in the difficult position of either issuing a license that includes

8

1

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.

19See discussion infra Part ll.B.

20
See Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 595 A.2d438 (Me. 1991);
Long Lake Energy Corp. v. New York State Dep't. of Envtl. Conservation, 563 N.Y.S.2d 871
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
21Lisa M. Bogardus, State CertificationoflHydroelectricFacilitiesUnderSection 401
of the Clean Water Act, 12 VA. ENvrL. L.J., 43 (1992). One result of the abuse by the states is
to "frustrate an already complex and inefficient Federal licensing process for hydropower
projects." Clean Water Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and
Environment of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Comm., 104th Cong. 781-793
(1995) (statement of Roger Purdom, President,National Hydropower Ass'n) [hereinafter Purdom].
"This policy trend is having significant impacts on the economics of hydropower projects - high
regulatory costs and a lack of certainty in the licensing process are inhibiting the ability of
hydropower22to compete." Id.
See discussion infra note 47.
23Town of Summersville, West Virginia, 60 F.E.R.C. 61,291 at 61,990 (1992). See
99
also, Carex Hydro, 52 F.E.R.C. 61,216 at 61,769 (1 0); Central Maine Power Co., 52 F.E.R.C.
61,033 at 61,172 (1990).
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conditions that it believes to be unlawful or denying the application
altogether and depriving the public of the benefits of the project. 4
B. Public Utility DistrictNo. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington
DepartmentofEcology: An Expensive Interpretation of State
Authority Under the CWA
Public UtilityDistrictNo. I ofJefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology (PUD 1)25 is illustrative of the continuing
conflicts between federal and state authority in the hydropower
licensing process. In PUD 1, the United States Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether a state could condition section 401
certification of a hydroelectric project on minimum stream flow
requirements pursuant to its authority under the CWA. The Court held
that the requirements were permissible conditions of the certification
and that the state's authority to impose those requirements did not
interfere with the FERC's authority under the FPA. However, the court
did not reach the question of whether the state-imposed minimum flow
requirements would be binding on the FERC.26
In PUD 1, the City of Tacoma and the Jefferson County Public
Utility District No. 1 (collectively, Tacoma) proposed to construct a
hydroelectric project that would result in discharges. Tacoma obtained
a certification from the Washington Department of Ecology that placed
a minimum stream flow condition on the project. Because the flow
rates required by the Department would lessen the power generated by
the hydropower facility, Tacoma objected. They contended that the
state did not have authority under section 401 to impose the condition.27
The Supreme Court examined the language of section 401 and
found that, though section 401(a) specifically provides that state
certification is required for a "discharge" into waters, section 401(d)
expands that language by providing that a certification may impose
"other limitations" and "any other appropriate requirement of state law"
in order to comply with the CWA.2" The Court noted that the text of
401(d) refers to the compliance of the applicant and not to the

2468 F.E.R.C. 61,078 (1994).
25511 U.S. 700 (1994) [hereinafter PUD 1].
261d.at 710 -711,722.
27
1d.at 711.

28M."
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discharge. In effect, the Court placed greater significance on the
language of section 401 (d) rather than reading section 401 as a whole.29
The Court then turned to whether minimum stream flow
requirements served as a limitation reflecting "any other appropriate
requirement of state law."3 The Court analyzed section 30331 and found
that the imposition of a minimum stream flow would be consistent with
the "designated use" of the river as a fish habitat. 2 Tacoma argued that
section 303 requires states to protect designated uses solely through
implementation of specific "criteria." However, the Court found
section 303 should be "most naturally read" to say that water quality
standards contain two components: the designated use and the water
quality criteria. 3 Therefore, under section 40 1(d), a state may require
the applicant to comply with both the designated uses and the water
quality criteria of the state water quality standards. Since the Court
found the minimum stream flow requirement to protect a designated
use, the state could impose the requirement on the certification pursuant
to section 401(d).34
Finally, the Court held that there was no reason to determine
whether the state's authority to impose minimum stream flow
requirements interfered with the FERC's authority under the FPA. The
Court stated that no conflict was presented, because the FERC had not
yet acted on Tacoma's license application. However, the Court
mentioned its previous holding in Californiav. FERC,36 in which it held
that "the California Water Resources Board, acting pursuant to state
law, could not impose a minimum stream flow which conflicted with
minimum stream flows contained in a FERC license" and concluded
that "the FPA did not 'save' to the States this authority. 37
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, argued that minimum stream
flow requirements were beyond the state's conditioning authority under
29

1d"

"Id.
3t

at 714-715.
See discussion supra note 16.
32511 U.S. at 714.
33
Id. at 715.

34
351d. at

714-15.
The Court stated that it did not want to speculate on a "hypothetical" conflict
between the two statutes; ifthe FERC included minimum stream flow conditions which Tacoma
considered to be invalid due to its interference with the FERC's authority pursuant to the FPA,
then Tacoma could seek judicial relief at that time. Further, the FERC may deny the application
altogether, or the FERC license may contain the same conditions as those in the state certification.
Id. at 722-23.
36495 U.S. 490 (1990).

37511 U.S. at 722 (citing California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 498).
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section 401 (a), because they had no relation to a "discharge" that would
result from the project.3" Justice Thomas argued that the majority's
interpretation of section 401 would allow state agencies "to pursue ...
their water goals in any way they choose" and "the conditions imposed
on certifications need not relate to discharges, nor to water quality
criteria, nor to any objective or quantifiable standard, so long as they
tend to make the water more suitable for the uses the State has
chosen.3 9 Justice Thomas further stated that the result of the decision
was to give the states "limitless" power under 401 (d) to protect abstract
"uses" of the water.4
In addition to the reasons discussed in the dissent, PUD I has
also been criticized for the burden it places on hydropower license
applicants.4 ' As one commentator noted, "[a]lthough the decision does
not answer whether state imposed minimum stream flow conditions in
401 certifications are binding on FERC, [PUD 1] is a sizable step in
state authority to regulate waterways, with potentially far reaching
water policy ramifications." 2

dissenting). The dissent stated:
381d. at 724 (Thomas, J.,
In my view, the Court makes three fundamental errors. First, it adopts an
interpretation that fails adequately to harmonize the subsections of § 401.
Second, it places no meaningful limitation on a State's authority under §

401 to impose conditions on certification. Third, it gives little or no
consideration to the fact that its interpretation of § 401 will significantly

disrupt the carefully crafted federal-state balance embodied in the Federal
Power Act.

Id.
"Id. at 731.
401d

Old.
41Inhis testimony regarding the reauthorization of the CWA, Roger Purdom, President
of the National Power Association, stated:
The Supreme Court's ruling in this case creates a dual regulatory process
for hydroelectric resources at the state water quality agencies under Section
401 to allow for the imposition of license conditions unrelated to pollution
control, such as minimum stream flows for fish habitat, aesthetic, and
recreational requirements. The result has been duplication of licensing
costs, conflicting license requirements, and unbalanced regulatory
decision-making.
Purdom, sufra note 21.
W. Herbert McHarg, Public Utility DistrictNo. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology: A Strong Holding for State Authority to Regulate. But Will it Hold
Water?, 15 J.ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvL. L. 140, 158 (1995).
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mH.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Tunbridge Mill Corporation (Tunbridge), pursuant to
section 401 of the CWA, petitioned the Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources (VANR) for certification of a small hydroelectric facility.43
Tunbridge and the VANR discussed this possibility and agreed on the
conditions that would be included in the certification, which contained
minimum stream flow and fishery protection conditions. Tunbridge
then sought an original hydroelectric license from the FERC under Part
1 of the FPA." The FERC granted Tunbridge a forty-year license to
construct and operate the "Tunbridge Mill Project." 5 The Commission,
however, refused to incorporate three state conditions' into the license,
stating that those conditions were beyond the scope of Vermont's
authority under the CWA and were thus unlawful.47 American Rivers
and Vermont filed motions to intervene and petitions for rehearing,
challenging the holding of the FERC. The Commission granted the

43

American Rivers Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 102 (2nd Cir. 1997).
"Tunbridge Mill Corp., 68 F.E.R.C. 161,078 (1994). The project is required to be
licensed under section 23(b)(1) of the FPA due to its location on a stream over which Congress
has jurisdiction under the authority of the Commerce Clause. 16 U.S.C. § 817(1988).
4568 F.E.R.C. at 61,078 (1994).
'rThestate certification contained eighteen conditions, three of which were excluded
from the FERC Order Issuing License, as follows:
Condition J states that any significant changes to the project or its
operation should be submitted to Vermont for review and approval.
Condition L provides that construction cannot commence until the licensee
receives state approval for items required in Conditions B, C, D, E, and J
* . .[and] [c]ondition P is a 'reopener' provision, allowing the state to
reserve the right to alter terms and conditions as necessary to protect water
quality.
Id. Similar minimum stream flow and fishery conditions which were at issue in Public Utility
were found by the FERC in TunbridgeMill to be valid under the CWA, and they were therefore
included in the license. 75 F.E.R.C. 61,175 (1996).
71d. Prior to its holding in Tunbridge Mill, the FERC had consistently held that
review of the appropriateness of state conditions was within thejurisdiction ofthe state courts and
not the Commission. Id. In Tunbridge Mill, the FERC reversed its position, stating:
After careful consideration, we have decided that our prior conclusion
regarding the mandatory nature of conditions contained in state water
quality certifications was incorrect... [wie conclude that we have the
authority to determine that such conditions do not become terms and
conditions of the licenses we issue ... [w]e believe that in light of
Congress' determination that the Commission should have the paramount
role in the hydropower licensing process, whether certain state conditions
are outside the scope of 401 (d) is a federal question to be answered by the
Commission.
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48
motions to intervene and denied the petitions for rehearing.
Petitioners American Rivers and Vermont sought review in the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Relying primarily on its holding in Tunbridge Mill, the FERC
licensed several other hydroelectric projects and again refused to
incorporate state-imposed conditions into the licenses which it believed
were in violation of the CWA.4" The petitioners sought review of those
orders as well, after the Commission had granted their motions to
intervene and denied their petitions for rehearing."0

IV. DECISION ANALYSIS

The central issue in American Rivers was whether the FERC
could exclude state conditions from hydropower licenses if it
determined that those conditions were beyond the scope of the states'
authority under the CWA. Therefore, the "crux of the dispute" was
whether the FERC had the authority to determine which conditions
were valid under section 401 of the CWA. l
A. Statutory Construction of the CWA
Petitioners contended the language of section 401(d) clearly
indicates that conditions must be included in a license as they appear in
the state certification and the FERC had no authority to review those
conditions to decide if they conformed with the CWA 2 The FERC
disagreed, arguing that section 401(d) is not as clear as petitioners
alleged. The FERC contended that the states' authority under section
401(d) is limited to imposing only those conditions which are
reasonably related to water quality and valid under the provisions of
section 401. The FERC further argued that it could exclude any

id.
48Tunbridge Mill Corp., 75 F.E.R.C.
49

61,175 (1996).

See Green Mountain Power Corp., 70 F.E.R.C.

62,205 (1995), reh "g denied, 75

F.E.R.C. 61,250 (1996); Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 69 F.E.R.C. I 62,197; 62, 198;
62,199; 62,200 (1994), reh 'gdenied, 75 F.E.R.C. 61,263 (1996). The FERC licensed one Green
Mountain project and relicensed four Central Vermont projects for a total of five projects which
were licensed under the reasoning of TunbridgeMill. Id.
501"29 F.3d 99, 104-105 (2nd Cir. 1997).
51
52

d. at 102-07.

See discussion supra note 18.
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conditions that it found to be outside of the states' section 401
authority."
The Court of Appeals first noted that the FERC's interpretation
of the CWA does not receive deference under the doctrine of Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,' because
administration of the CWA is delegated to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and not the FERC." The Court then applied
a "plain meaning" analysis to section 401(d) of the Act,56 emphasizing
that certification conditions shall become conditions on a federal
license and finding that language "unequivocal."57 Therefore, the court
agreed with the petitioners' belief that the language was clear and that
the FERC was required under 401 (d) to incorporate all conditions.
The FERC argued that the language of 401(d), though
mandatory, restricts the substantive authority of the states to impose
only those conditions which relate to water quality. The court agreed,
stating that the section, "reasonably read in light of its purpose, restricts
conditions that states can impose to those affecting water quality in one
manner or another."5 Although the court recognized that the state's
authority is limited, it found that the language in section 401(d) does
not delegate to the FERC any authority to decide which conditions are
valid under section 401.59

The FERC also argued that two other sections of the Act,
401(a)(3)" and 401(a)(5), 61 give it the authority to review stateimposed conditions. Section 401(a)(3) provides that state certification
for a federal license shall fulfill the requirements for any subsequent
federal licenses which affect the same facility. 2 Section 401(a)(5)
affords the licensing agency the authority to suspend or revoke a license

53129 F.3d at 102.
'467 U.S. 837 (1984). The doctrine of Chevron is that "considerable weight should

be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations." Id. at 844.
55129 F.3d at 107. Section 101 of the CWA states that "the Administrator of the
Environmental
Protection Agency ... shall administer this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977).
56The Court notes that it is generally assumed "that Congress expresses its purposes
through the ordinary meaning of the words it uses." 129 F.3d at 107 (quoting Escondido Mutual
Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984)).
57129 F.3d at 107.
5

81d.

59
1H
6033 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(3) (1977).
6133 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (1977).
6233 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(3) (1997).
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if it is found to be in violation of certain provisions of the CWA.63 The
court found that the FERC did not establish that it has been given any
authority by Congress to determine whether the state-imposed
conditions are consistent with the provisions.'
B. Analagous Cases
The Commission argued that the D.C. Circuit Court ofAppeals,
in Keating v. FERC,65 rejected the petitioners' argument based on the
plain meaning of section 401(d) and held that the FERC had the
authority to review and reject state-imposed conditions which were not
valid under section 401. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
of the case, stating that the FERC read the holding
this interpretation
66
broadly.
too
In Keating, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
confronted the issue of whether the FERC or the state court had
jurisdiction to decide whether a state's purported revocation of its
certification was valid under the terms of 401(a)(3). The petitioner in
Keating, seeking to operate a hydroelectric facility, obtained a permit
from the Army Corps of Engineers under section 404. The Corps had
obtained certification from the state for a "nationwide permit," 67 and
Keating was assured by the state that the project had certification under
that permit. Keating then applied for a hydropower license from the
FERC. The state, however, claimed to have revoked the certification,
stating that it "never intended by its blanket Corps [section 404]
certification to certify any individual projects for purposes of a later
federal power license. 68 The FERC declined to issue a license,
asserting that it had no power to apply the provisions of section
401(a)(3) and that the revocation must be reviewed by the state court.69
The KeatingCourt found that the state's prior certification was
sufficient to obtain a federal license and that the state could not revoke
the certification for reasons other than those listed in section

6333 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(5) (1997).
64129 F.3dat 108.
65927 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
66129 F.3d at 109.
67

A nationwide permit is one that "authorizes any party to engage in the sort ofactivity

described in the permit without the need to seek prior project-specific authorization." 927 F.2d
at 619.
68

Id. at 620.

Old. at 624.
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401(a)(3).7 ° Further, the court held that because section 401(a)(3)
required an application of federal law, and "[a] state can affect federal
authority under section 401(a)(3) only to the extent therein indicated,"
then the application of that section "involves a federal question that,
absent satisfactory explanation, presumably must be resolved by the
applicable federal licensing authority and the federal courts."'"
Therefore, the FERC must determine whether the revocation by the
state of its certification was proper under 401 (a)(3).
The FERC argued inAmerican Rivers that the Court of Appeals
for the District ofColumbia's ruling in Keatingsupported its contention
that it could reject state conditions which were invalid under section
401. The Second Circuit, however, found that Keating only addressed
the narrow issue of the FERC's authority to determine whether a valid
certificate exists under section 401; this narrow ruling did not give the
FERC broad authority to review a state's conditions.72
The Second Circuit found Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La

Jolla Band of Mission Indians13 to be more on point than Keating. In
Escondido, the Supreme Court considered a pre-license plan within the
FPA itself Section 4(e) provides that the Secretary of the Interior
"shall" place conditions on licenses issued for hydropower projects
within Native American reservations. " The FERC refused to accept
the conditions. In Escondido, as in American Rivers, the Court focused
on the plain language of the statute, finding that "[t]he mandatory
nature of the language chosen by Congress appears to require that the
Commission include the Secretary's conditions in the license even if it
disagrees with them.""
The FERC argued that this case is distinguishable from
Escondido due to the Court's holding that the Commission was not
required to include conditions regarding Native American reservations
which did not have any of the licensed facilities on their property. As
the Commission stated in Tunbridge,Escondido held that
section 4(e)'s requirement that the license "shall"
include the proposed conditions is not absolute; the
Commission may reject conditions that fall outside the
7

"1d.
at 618.
71
1d. at 624.
72129 F.3d 99, 108 (2nd Cir. 1997).
73466 U.S. 765 (1984).

7416 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1920).
75129 F.3d at 109 (quoting 466 U.S. at 772).
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scope of section 4(e) in that they purport to apply to
projects or parts of projects not located within a
reservation. This supports our conclusion that we can
reject conditions that fall outside the scope of section
401.76
In American Rivers the Second Circuit found that this "unremarkable
holding" did not support the Commission's argument.
C. The FPA
The FERC argued that, in addition to violating the terms of the
CWA, the state conditions imposed on Tunbridge also violated the FPA
itself. Specifically, the FERC argued that: (1) the conditions that
imposed deadlines conflicted with section 13 of the FPA,77 (2) the
reopener and pre-approval conditions violated section 6 of the FPA,7"
and (3) the conditions violated the balanced approach to environmental
concerns in the Electric Consumers Protection Act (ECPA).79
Curiously, the court did not address the first two of these arguments but
simply repeated that the Commission failed to establish that a
Congressional mandate gives it authority to review section 401
conditions. Concerning the ECPA amendments to the FPA, the
Commission argued that their provisions would be disturbed, since
states would have the ability to label all of their would-be
"recommendations" as conditions on the certification and would thus
The Commission
usurp the FERC decision-making authority.80
contended that this result would be impermissible because section
511 (a) of the CWA provides that the Act "shall not be construed as ...
limiting the authority or functions of any officer or agency of the United
States under any other law or regulation not inconsistent with this

7675 F.E.R.C. 61,175 (1996) (citing 446 U.S. at 780-781).
7716 U.S.C. § 806 (1920). This section "places construction deadlines largely within

the discretion of the Commission and generally contemplates that construction will be
commenced within two years of the date of the license." 129 F.3d at I 11.
7816 U.S.C. § 799 (1920). This section limits the period of a license to fifty years and
states that "[e]ach such license shall be conditioned upon acceptance by the licensee of all the
terms and conditions of this chapter and such further conditions, if any, as the Commission shall
prescribe in79conformity with this chapter." Id.
Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986), amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a),
8036) (1920). For a general discussion of the ECPA, see John D. Echeverria, The Electric
Consumers ProtectionAct of1986, 8 ENERGY L.J. 61 (1987).
80129 F.3d at 112.
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8 However, the Court found that 511 (a) is inapplicable

82
because the ECPA is inconsistent with the terms of the CWA.

D. Interference With the FPA
The FERC contended that if the states were able to impose
conditions that were not valid under the CWA, it would give them "the
kind of governance and enforcement authority that is critical and
exclusive to administer a license under the Federal Power Act, a power
which the courts have repeatedly concluded belongs to the
Commission."83 While recognizing the broad federal role of the FERC
in hydropower licensing and sympathizing with its inability to reject
state conditions, the Second Circuit considered the Commission's
concerns to be "overblown."84 In support of this statement, the court
noted that an applicant can seek review of the license conditions and
that the FERC has the ability to reject a license altogether.
The Second Circiut suggested that the applicant has the ability
to seek review of the validity of the conditions. However, the FERC
has asserted that it cannot rely on applicants to appeal conditions that
exceed the scope of section 401 and "infringe on the Commission's
direct and exclusive jurisdiction over the project works and
operations.""5 The court noted that Escondido addressed the same
problem, and quoted the Supreme Court's proposition that "Congress
apparently decided that if no party was interested in the differences
between the Commission and the Secretary, the dispute would best be
resolved in a nonjudicial forum."86 This reference shows that the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals failed to recognize the problems in the
current licensing process, which is extremely complex and expensive.87
Some applicants would rather settle for unfavorable conditions than go
through the long, expensive process of hearings and reviews.
The Court also suggested that the FERC failed to acknowledge
81

1d. at 111 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1977)).

82Jd. at 112.
83
Brief for Respondent at 16, Id. at Il1.
141d.

8575 F.E.R.C. 61,175 (1996).
86466 U.S. at 779, n. 20. The language begins, "[w]e note that in the unlikely event that
none of the parties to the licensing process seeks review, the conditions will go into effect

notwithstanding the Commission's objection to them since the Commission is not authorized to
seek review87of its own decisions." Id.
"[Hjigh regulatory costs and a lack of certainty in the licensing process are inhibiting
the ability of hydropower to compete with other generation resources." Purdom, supra note 21.
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its ability to deny an applicant's license altogether if it appears that its
authority under the FPA will suffer. However, the Commission was all
too aware of this authority, recognizing that denial of a license has
detrimental effects and deprives both private and public interests of the
benefits of the project." That does not serve the purpose of the FPA,
nor does it solve the problem of the states' imposing conditions which
are not within their authority pursuant to section 401.
V. CONCLUSION

InAmerican Rivers, the court considered the plain language of
section 401 and held that the CWA gave the state complete authority to
determine the conditions of its certification of hydropower projects.
Read in conjunction with PUD 1, American Rivers has given states the
power to include conditions in their certifications that are unrelated to
water quality and to impose those invalid conditions on a federal
hydropower license.
The question of whether state conditions are outside the scope
of their authority pursuant to section 401(d) is a federal question to be
answered by the Commission. 9 Because the conditions of the
certification become incorporated into the federal license, the
conditions are subject to review by the FERC and federal courts." In
addition, because both the CWA and FPA indicate that the FERC may
revoke or suspend the license or review its own grant or denial of the
license, the role of the state ends when the state certification has been
granted. 91

The Court in American Rivers did not properly consider the
FERC's intended role in hydropower licensing or that the state
agencies, which only consider the interests of the state, will easily
override the FERC. In order to have a comprehensive approach to the
hydropower licensing process, which considers both private and public
88129 F.3d at 111. See also Tunbridge, 68 F.E.R.C.

61,175.
One commentator noted:
States have the opportunity to anticipate projects, like hydroelectric
facilities, when they develop water quality criteria to protect a water
body's uses. Having developed these criteria, states should not be able to
revisit their decisions outside of the political process or interfere in the
federally preempted field of hydropower licensing unless Congress
authorizes otherwise.
Bogardus, supra note 21 at 101.
90Bogardus, supra note 21 at 99.
91
89

1d.
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interests, the FERC needs to have its central decision-making authority
restored. Judicial interpretations of the CWA have disrupted the
balance that the FPA intended to maintain for the licensing process. It
is time for Congress to restore the balance and enact legislation which
will settle the conflict. Otherwise, interference with the FERC's
authority will disrupt the comprehensive purpose of the FPA and could
negatively impact the future of hydropower, a valuable and essential
energy source.

